Delegating pollution permits*
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2022-04 · 124 (2) · 457-487
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12468 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 25.04.2022. Verfasst von Tapas Kundu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We discuss the decision to delegate the regulation of pollution through sales of permits to a biased expert in a situation where the polluting firm has private information about its technology. We consider, in particular, constrained delegation where the government puts restrictions on the amount of pollution that the expert can sell permits for. We find that, in general, delegation is more likely if the firm is low‐cost. This is not in line with the so‐called uncertainty principle, which states that there is more delegation the more uncertainty the government faces.
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APA
Kundu, T., & Nilssen, T. (2022). Delegating pollution permits*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 124(2), 457-487. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12468
Vancouver
Kundu T, Nilssen T. Delegating pollution permits*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2022;124(2):457-487. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12468
BibTeX
@article{Kundu2022,
author = {Kundu, Tapas and Nilssen, Tore},
title = {Delegating pollution permits*},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {124},
number = {2},
pages = {457--487},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12468}
}
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