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Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2020-07 · 122 (3) · 937-965

DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12362 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 28.10.2019. Verfasst von Tommy Andersson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 33-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.

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APA

Andersson, T., & Ehlers, L. (2020). Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 122(3), 937-965. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12362

Vancouver

Andersson T, Ehlers L. Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2020;122(3):937-965. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12362

BibTeX
@article{Andersson2020,
  author = {Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars},
  title = {Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*},
  journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {122},
  number = {3},
  pages = {937--965},
  doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12362}
}
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