Higher Price, Lower Costs? Minimum Prices in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2019-04 · 121 (2) · 446-481
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12279 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 20.02.2019. Verfasst von Jan Abrell und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Kommission für Technologie und Innovation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we examine the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system (ETS) when some emissions are regulated outside the ETS. We theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare. Using a numerical simulation model of the European Union (EU), we find that moderate minimum prices in the EU ETS can reduce the costs of EU climate policy by up to 30 percent. We also find that, because of tax‐interaction effects, the optimal minimum price in the EU ETS should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non‐ETS sectors.
Förderung
- Kommission für Technologie und Innovation
Zitieren
APA
Abrell, J., Rausch, S., & Yonezawa, H. (2019). Higher Price, Lower Costs? Minimum Prices in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 121(2), 446-481. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12279
Vancouver
Abrell J, Rausch S, Yonezawa H. Higher Price, Lower Costs? Minimum Prices in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2019;121(2):446-481. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12279
BibTeX
@article{Abrell2019,
author = {Abrell, Jan and Rausch, Sebastian and Yonezawa, Hidemichi},
title = {Higher Price, Lower Costs? Minimum Prices in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2019},
volume = {121},
number = {2},
pages = {446--481},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12279}
}
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