Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2018-07 · 120 (3) · 685-716
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12240 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 09.07.2018. Verfasst von Fabrizio Adriani und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider a signaling model in which adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parents as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way (i.e., the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm). We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.
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APA
Adriani, F., & Sonderegger, S. (2018). Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120(3), 685-716. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12240
Vancouver
Adriani F, Sonderegger S. Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2018;120(3):685-716. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12240
BibTeX
@article{Adriani2018,
author = {Adriani, Fabrizio and Sonderegger, Silvia},
title = {Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2018},
volume = {120},
number = {3},
pages = {685--716},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12240}
}
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