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The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance

Dehai Liu iD, Kun Qian, Huang Ding

Risk Analysis · 2025

DOI: 10.1111/risa.17702 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Risk Analysis, 2025. Verfasst von Dehai Liu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Public Administration, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Health Information Management, Pandemics, Public Health. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, National Social Science Found of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The unpredictability of the epidemics caused by new, unknown viruses, combined with differing responsibilities among government departments, often leads to a prisoner's dilemma in epidemic information governance. In this context, the whistle‐blower effect in the health departments leads to delayed reporting to avoid potential retaliation, and the cry‐wolf effect in the administrative departments results in sustained observation to avoid ineffective warnings. To address these challenges, we employ game theory to analyze the dynamics of epidemic information governance and focus on two external governance mechanisms—superior accountability and media supervision—that can help resolve the prisoner's dilemma during and after an outbreak. Our analysis indicates that it is necessary to increase the strategic coordination of whistle‐blowers in the short‐term decision‐making during the outbreak. From a long‐term evolution perspective, maintaining optimal levels of superior accountability and media supervision is essential to overcoming the prisoner's dilemma. Media supervision works more slowly in the implement effectiveness than more direct superior accountability. This paper highlights the crucial roles of the whistle‐blower effect and the cry‐wolf effect in coordination failures of epidemic information governance during outbreaks of unknown viruses. It clarifies the strategic coordination pathways between expert systems and bureaucratic systems and emphasizes the importance of superior accountability and media supervision to enable effective, collaborative epidemic information governance.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Health Information ManagementPandemicsPublic HealthGovernment AgenciesDisease OutbreaksCOVID-19Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.United StatesHumans

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Collaborative governancecry‐wolf effectevolutionary gamesnovel infectious diseaseswhistle‐blower effect

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Public Administration, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China.
  • School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China.
  • School of Political Science and Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China.

ORCID-Profile: Dehai Liu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • National Social Science Found of China

Zitieren

APA

Liu, D., Qian, K., & Ding, H. (2025). The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance. Risk Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.17702

Vancouver

Liu D, Qian K, Ding H. The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance. Risk Analysis. 2025. doi:10.1111/risa.17702

BibTeX
@article{Liu2025,
  author = {Liu, Dehai and Qian, Kun and Ding, Huang},
  title = {The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance},
  journal = {Risk Analysis},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1111/risa.17702}
}
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