Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz's “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”
Ratio Juris · 13.05.2026
DOI: 10.1111/raju.70015 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ratio Juris, online erschienen am 13.05.2026. Verfasst von Eugenio Bulygin. Die Arbeit nennt 7 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper (appearing here for the first time in English) is part of a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin previously published in 2007 in Spanish by Marcial Pons and now featured in this special issue of Ratio Juris . In responding to Raz, Bulygin sets out his main points of disagreement with Raz on the question, Can there be a theory of law? Bulygin challenges Raz's view of legal theory as consisting of necessarily true propositions that explain the nature of law by picking out a set of essential properties independent of the concepts used to identify law. He argues, on the contrary, that the necessary or essential properties of a thing (and so of law) depend on the concept we use to refer to this thing (law), suggesting that legal theories accordingly yield a plurality of concepts rather than uncovering a single privileged concept of law.
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APA
Bulygin, E. (2026). Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz's “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”. Ratio Juris. https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.70015
Vancouver
Bulygin E. Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz's “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”. Ratio Juris. 2026. doi:10.1111/raju.70015
BibTeX
@article{Bulygin2026,
author = {Bulygin, Eugenio},
title = {Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz's “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”},
journal = {Ratio Juris},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/raju.70015}
}
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