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When More Is More: Committee Overlap and the Diversity of Information in Problem Definition

Connor Dye

Policy Studies Journal · 2026-11 · 54 (4)

DOI: 10.1111/psj.70173 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Policy Studies Journal, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Connor Dye. Die Arbeit nennt 82 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Congress relies on a fragmented bureaucracy to monitor complex problems, raising concerns over whether it can aggregate the diverse information needed for effective policy‐making. I argue that competition among committees with different institutional ties to agencies should produce informational diversity without any coordinating body. Analyzing 92,375 instances of agency testimony across 131 agencies from 1973 to 2021, I find that a greater number of committees examining a problem is consistently associated with a broader and less concentrated set of agencies supplying information. I find little evidence that this association is systematically moderated by public salience.

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APA

Dye, C. (2026). When More Is More: Committee Overlap and the Diversity of Information in Problem Definition. Policy Studies Journal, 54(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70173

Vancouver

Dye C. When More Is More: Committee Overlap and the Diversity of Information in Problem Definition. Policy Studies Journal. 2026;54(4). doi:10.1111/psj.70173

BibTeX
@article{Dye2026,
  author = {Dye, Connor},
  title = {When More Is More: Committee Overlap and the Diversity of Information in Problem Definition},
  journal = {Policy Studies Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {54},
  number = {4},
  doi = {10.1111/psj.70173}
}
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