Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2026-07 · 113 (1) · 44-58
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70114 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online erschienen am 03.05.2026. Verfasst von Abraham Mathew. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Philosophical orthodoxy has it that forgiveness is always discretionary—a gift we are free to extend to those who wrong us, but one that we are never morally required to offer. I dispute this orthodoxy, arguing that forgiveness is sometimes obligatory, even though wrongdoers can never demand or otherwise extract it from us. In particular, I argue that having accepted forgiveness in the past sometimes makes it obligatory to forgive one's future wrongdoers. The obligation to forgive because one was forgiven is grounded, not in a correlative right to forgiveness held by one's wrongdoer, but in a moral norm of consistency that applies to how we accept and extend forgiveness. The resulting account sheds new light on the nature and scope of our discretion to forgive and on the possibility of obligations to others without correlative rights.
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APA
Mathew, A. (2026). Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 113(1), 44-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70114
Vancouver
Mathew A. Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2026;113(1):44-58. doi:10.1111/phpr.70114
BibTeX
@article{Mathew2026,
author = {Mathew, Abraham},
title = {Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {113},
number = {1},
pages = {44--58},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.70114}
}
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