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Inquiry for the mistaken and confused

Arianna Falbo

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-11 · 109 (3) · 962-985

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13089 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online erschienen am 18.07.2024. Verfasst von Arianna Falbo. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 88 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Various philosophers have recently defended norms of inquiry which forbid inquiry into questions which lack true answers. I argue that these norms are overly restrictive, and that they fail to capture an important relationship between inquiry and our position as non‐ideal epistemic agents. I defend a more flexible and forgiving norm: Epistemic Improvement. According to this norm, inquiry into a question is permissible only if it's not rational for one to be sure that by inquiring one won't improve epistemically upon the question. This norm illuminates the significant role that inquiry plays in our lives, given our epistemic nonideality, and it also motivates a robust understanding of the value of inquiry, as encompassing epistemic improvements which go beyond figuring out the answers to questions.

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APA

Falbo, A. (2024). Inquiry for the mistaken and confused. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 109(3), 962-985. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13089

Vancouver

Falbo A. Inquiry for the mistaken and confused. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;109(3):962-985. doi:10.1111/phpr.13089

BibTeX
@article{Falbo2024,
  author = {Falbo, Arianna},
  title = {Inquiry for the mistaken and confused},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {109},
  number = {3},
  pages = {962--985},
  doi = {10.1111/phpr.13089}
}
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