Moral‐Epistemic Dilemmas: The Case of Gender in Medical Diagnosis
Philosophical Perspectives · 2026-12 · 40 (1) · 44-57
DOI: 10.1111/phpe.70005 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Perspectives, online erschienen am 23.09.2026. Verfasst von Elizabeth Barnes. Die Arbeit nennt 64 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I describe what I call “moral‐epistemic dilemmas”. The central features of such cases are: (i) an agent is obligated to take a view (i.e., they cannot simply refrain from drawing a conclusion); (ii) the view the agent takes is action‐guiding; (iii) there are competing options for how the agent should evaluate evidence (and what information they should consider as evidential) when taking a view; (iv) there are both moral and epistemic costs associated with each of their competing options. To illustrate this phenomenon, I use the example of statistical inferences based on gender in medical diagnosis. In such cases, I argue, there are costs to both accuracy and fairness if a physician applies gender‐based generalizations to a female patient, and likewise potential costs to both accuracy and fairness if a physician fails to apply such generalizations. The net result is a dilemma in which both horns have epistemic and moral risks.
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APA
Barnes, E. (2026). Moral‐Epistemic Dilemmas: The Case of Gender in Medical Diagnosis. Philosophical Perspectives, 40(1), 44-57. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.70005
Vancouver
Barnes E. Moral‐Epistemic Dilemmas: The Case of Gender in Medical Diagnosis. Philosophical Perspectives. 2026;40(1):44-57. doi:10.1111/phpe.70005
BibTeX
@article{Barnes2026,
author = {Barnes, Elizabeth},
title = {Moral‐Epistemic Dilemmas: The Case of Gender in Medical Diagnosis},
journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
year = {2026},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
pages = {44--57},
doi = {10.1111/phpe.70005}
}
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