Tales from an apostate
Philosophical Issues · 2019-10 · 29 (1) · 69-83
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12165 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Issues, online erschienen am 24.09.2019. Verfasst von Kristie Dotson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Here I outline an often under‐appreciated position within Anglo‐analytic epistemology, that of the apostate to operative metaphilosophical constraints. To help identify and promote awareness of metaphilosophical apostacy, here, I describe the form of metaphilosophical apostacy that I practice in Anglo‐analytic epistemology (AAE). My apostasy with respect to AAE begins with significant, metaphilosophical divergences or deep senses of incongruence. A metaphilosophical divergence, on my account, refers to conflict at the level of inquiry‐shaping assumptions, constraints, aims, and/or commitments. In this paper, I claim that one way metaphilosophical apostasy emerges in Anglo‐analytic epistemology is when inquiry‐shaping divergences lead to conceptual indifference. Conceptual indifference, on my account, refers to disinterest that can follow from divergent metaphilosophical and/or aspirational aims and goals for one's favored investigations. To be clear, this is a paper for the growing population of epistemologists who find operative metaphilosophical constraints in AAE ill‐fitting.
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APA
Dotson, K. (2019). Tales from an apostate. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 69-83. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12165
Vancouver
Dotson K. Tales from an apostate. Philosophical Issues. 2019;29(1):69-83. doi:10.1111/phis.12165
BibTeX
@article{Dotson2019,
author = {Dotson, Kristie},
title = {Tales from an apostate},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
year = {2019},
volume = {29},
number = {1},
pages = {69--83},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12165}
}
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