An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support
Philosophical Issues · 2016-10 · 26 (1) · 130-147
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12078 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Issues, online erschienen am 22.10.2016. Verfasst von Sinan Dogramaci und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 66-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness.
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APA
Dogramaci, S., & Horowitz, S. (2016). An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 130-147. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12078
Vancouver
Dogramaci S, Horowitz S. An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support. Philosophical Issues. 2016;26(1):130-147. doi:10.1111/phis.12078
BibTeX
@article{Dogramaci2016,
author = {Dogramaci, Sinan and Horowitz, Sophie},
title = {An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
year = {2016},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
pages = {130--147},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12078}
}
EUVIMED