Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?
Analytic Philosophy · 26.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/phib.70021 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 26.07.2026. Verfasst von Bernhard Ritter. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Austrian Science Fund.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do I have something no one else can have when I am in pain? This puzzle about the so‐called ‘privacy of ownership’ of sensations is a special case of the problem of whether the states and qualities of a subject are particulars. (For if someone ‘has’ a pain, then that someone ‘is in’ a pain state and vice versa.) The debate addressing the problem is unclear regarding the distinction between what is ‘had’ in having pain and owner‐individuated experiential episodes. The most common answer to the question claims that other people cannot have the numerically identical pain but only a qualitatively identical one. Building on recent work on states, events, and processes, I show that this answer is caught in a trilemma when faced with the task of identifying the allegedly unshareable particular that is ‘had’; a trilemma that renders the answer either incoherent, false, or trivial.
Förderung
- Austrian Science Fund
Zitieren
APA
Ritter, B. (2026). Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70021
Vancouver
Ritter B. Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?. Analytic Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/phib.70021
BibTeX
@article{Ritter2026,
author = {Ritter, Bernhard},
title = {Is Having a Pain Having an Unshareable Particular?},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/phib.70021}
}
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