A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”
Analytic Philosophy · 09.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/phib.70018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 09.07.2026. Verfasst von Jeffrey J. Watson. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I offer a variation on the Knowledge Argument, the “Resemblance Argument,” which argues that the accuracy conditions for representations of qualia require qualitative resemblance to the mode of presentation, whereas those for representations of physical states do not. The Resemblance Argument resists a number of popular current responses to the Knowledge Argument, including the Ability hypothesis, the Acquaintance hypothesis, and the “New Knowledge of an Old Fact” strategy. Because these responses focus on the concept of knowledge, but the Resemblance Argument makes no claims about knowledge, these responses fail. Some physicalist responses nonetheless survive the Resemblance Argument intact, including Illusionism and the Incomplete Physical Knowledge Strategy.
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APA
Watson, J. J. (2026). A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70018
Vancouver
Watson JJ. A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”. Analytic Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/phib.70018
BibTeX
@article{Watson2026,
author = {Watson, Jeffrey J.},
title = {A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/phib.70018}
}
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