Constructivism for Consciousness
Analytic Philosophy · 20.04.2026
DOI: 10.1111/phib.70009 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 20.04.2026. Verfasst von John Halpin. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The goal of this essay is to promote a non‐traditional physicalism for consciousness much as metaethical constructivisms are meant as naturalistic alternatives to traditional moral realism. The account on offer is based on a perspectival version of David Lewis's Humean “best‐system” account for scientific representation. On this version, suspect concepts are vindicated (from the perspective of a given science) when their use is required for ideal systematization. Lewis's important case, his hard problem, was to provide an Humean vindication of chance insofar as it is a required aspect of ideal physics, the best way (from the perspective of fundamental physics) to give a summary description of regularities. The present essay utilizes Michael Graziano's account of consciousness as proof‐of‐concept. Personal‐level psychology, if Graziano is correct, is best based on a brain schema evolved to systematize attention. This schema would seem to be precisely right for the perspectival best system: a “summary description” (Graziano's term also) requiring an awareness concept. I argue that the required concept is indeed both subjective and phenomenal so properly termed “awareness.” Moreover, even if Graziano's account is not correct, the constructivist approach described illustrates a new explanatory option for physicalism about the mind.
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APA
Halpin, J. (2026). Constructivism for Consciousness. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70009
Vancouver
Halpin J. Constructivism for Consciousness. Analytic Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/phib.70009
BibTeX
@article{Halpin2026,
author = {Halpin, John},
title = {Constructivism for Consciousness},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/phib.70009}
}
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