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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Contingent Grounding Physicalism

Alex Moran

Analytic Philosophy · 2026-12 · 67 (4) · 392-407

DOI: 10.1111/phib.12383 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 03.11.2025. Verfasst von Alex Moran. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 102 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung, Vetenskapsrådet.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie‐worlds. Arguments from the possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism do not, therefore, succeed. To establish this, the paper develops a form of physicalism on which the phenomenal facts are metaphysically grounded in the basic physical facts in accordance with metaphysically contingent grounding laws. It also draws out some important morals for the contemporary mind–body debate.

Förderung

  • Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
  • Vetenskapsrådet

Zitieren

APA

Moran, A. (2026). Contingent Grounding Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy, 67(4), 392-407. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12383

Vancouver

Moran A. Contingent Grounding Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy. 2026;67(4):392-407. doi:10.1111/phib.12383

BibTeX
@article{Moran2026,
  author = {Moran, Alex},
  title = {Contingent Grounding Physicalism},
  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {67},
  number = {4},
  pages = {392--407},
  doi = {10.1111/phib.12383}
}
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