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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Normative Nihilism

Lewis Williams

Philosophy Compass · 2026-05 · 21 (3)

DOI: 10.1111/phc3.70112 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy Compass, online erschienen am 23.06.2026. Verfasst von Lewis Williams. Die Arbeit nennt 82 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Linacre College, University of Oxford.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Normative nihilism is the more radical sibling of moral nihilism: while moral nihilists are nihilists only about the moral domain, normative nihilists are nihilists about all normativity. For example, normative nihilists have argued that there are no moral, prudential, epistemic, or instrumental reasons. This is a prima facie highly implausible view. But normative nihilism has received serious defence. Proponents argue that normative nihilism is implied by plausible premises, and that the prima facie implausibility of normative nihilism is susceptible to debunking. This article will work towards a philosophically illuminating characterisation of normative nihilism, assess arguments in support of the view, and survey its implications.

Förderung

  • Linacre College, University of Oxford

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APA

Williams, L. (2026). Normative Nihilism. Philosophy Compass, 21(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.70112

Vancouver

Williams L. Normative Nihilism. Philosophy Compass. 2026;21(3). doi:10.1111/phc3.70112

BibTeX
@article{Williams2026,
  author = {Williams, Lewis},
  title = {Normative Nihilism},
  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1111/phc3.70112}
}
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