Knowing in Aristotle part 2: Technē, phronēsis, sophia, and divine cognitive activities
Philosophy Compass · 2022-01 · 17 (1)
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12799 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy Compass, online erschienen am 09.12.2021. Verfasst von Caleb Murray Cohoe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this second of a 2‐part survey of Aristotle’s epistemology, I present an overview of Aristotle’s views on techne (craft or excellent productive reason) and phronēsis (practical wisdom or excellent practical reason). For Aristotle, attaining the truth in practical matters involves actually doing the right action. While technē and phronēsis are rational excellences, for Aristotle they are not as excellent or true as epistēmē or nous because the kinds of truth that they grasp are imperfect and because they are excellent states for humans, not simply speaking. I then discuss why Aristotle takes sophia (wisdom), understanding and scientific knowledge of the best things, to be its own excellence. While this is the best cognitive state for human beings, I argue that Aristotle thinks divine cognitive activity is different in kind and more perfect than any human activity.
Zitieren
APA
Cohoe, C. M. (2022). Knowing in Aristotle part 2: Technē, phronēsis, sophia, and divine cognitive activities. Philosophy Compass, 17(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12799
Vancouver
Cohoe CM. Knowing in Aristotle part 2: Technē, phronēsis, sophia, and divine cognitive activities. Philosophy Compass. 2022;17(1). doi:10.1111/phc3.12799
BibTeX
@article{Cohoe2022,
author = {Cohoe, Caleb Murray},
title = {Knowing in Aristotle part 2: Technē, phronēsis, sophia, and divine cognitive activities},
journal = {Philosophy Compass},
year = {2022},
volume = {17},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1111/phc3.12799}
}
EUVIMED