Financial Myopia in Closed Systems: How State Financial Monitoring Systems Can Ignore Local Constraints
Public Budgeting & Finance · 07.04.2026
DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.70024 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Public Budgeting & Finance, online erschienen am 07.04.2026. Verfasst von David J. Schwegman und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine how closed‐system state financial monitoring can misrepresent local fiscal health by ignoring broader legal and regulatory contexts. Using Texas as a case study, we show that school districts financing debt with renewable energy revenues are penalized under the state's monitoring system due to higher debt‐per‐pupil levels despite responding rationally to state incentives. This case illustrates a form of financial myopia, where rational financial behaviors are penalized under a monitoring system. We provide causal evidence of this dynamic and argue for an open‐systems approach to fiscal monitoring that recognizes the legal and fiscal environments shaping local financial decisions.
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APA
Schwegman, D. J., Brunner, E. J., Yu, J., & Chen, X. (2026). Financial Myopia in Closed Systems: How State Financial Monitoring Systems Can Ignore Local Constraints. Public Budgeting & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.70024
Vancouver
Schwegman DJ, Brunner EJ, Yu J, Chen X. Financial Myopia in Closed Systems: How State Financial Monitoring Systems Can Ignore Local Constraints. Public Budgeting & Finance. 2026. doi:10.1111/pbaf.70024
BibTeX
@article{Schwegman2026,
author = {Schwegman, David J. and Brunner, Eric J. and Yu, Jinhai and Chen, Xin},
title = {Financial Myopia in Closed Systems: How State Financial Monitoring Systems Can Ignore Local Constraints},
journal = {Public Budgeting & Finance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/pbaf.70024}
}
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