An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · 2026-06 · 107 (2) · 74-85
DOI: 10.1111/papq.70014 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 16.04.2026. Verfasst von Lei Zhong. Die Arbeit nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Philosophers have long debated whether phenomenal properties can play genuine causal roles. In this article, I aim to develop an emergentist approach to phenomenal causality, an approach that attributes novel causal powers to phenomenal properties and rejects the causal closure of physics. I also compare this emergentist approach with an influential competing approach to phenomenal causality, the compatibilist account, which postulates a model of causal overdetermination understood broadly. There is a widespread view in the philosophy of mind that emergentism is physicalistically unacceptable (whereas compatibilism is consistent with physicalism). However, the article attempts to challenge this consensus by arguing for a physicalist version of emergentism, according to which phenomenal properties as well as their novel causal powers are grounded by (noncausal) physical properties and facts.
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APA
Zhong, L. (2026). An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 107(2), 74-85. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.70014
Vancouver
Zhong L. An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2026;107(2):74-85. doi:10.1111/papq.70014
BibTeX
@article{Zhong2026,
author = {Zhong, Lei},
title = {An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality},
journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {107},
number = {2},
pages = {74--85},
doi = {10.1111/papq.70014}
}
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