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What Public Reason Liberals Do and Do Not Need to Say About Epistemology

Paul Billingham

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · 2026-03 · 107 (1) · 43-56

DOI: 10.1111/papq.70011 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 26.02.2026. Verfasst von Paul Billingham. Die Arbeit nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

An important question regarding public reason liberalism is how much (if anything) it needs to say about epistemology. This paper presents an answer to this question, arguing that the theory does not require reasonable citizens to hold any particular epistemological commitments (contra David Enoch's important critique), but does need to offer an epistemological explanation for the fact of reasonable disagreement. However, that explanation can be sufficiently minimal to be compatible with a wide range of fuller epistemological views. Further, the paper argues that this account of the place of epistemology within public reason liberalism mirrors the theory's structure with respect to moral justification, and indeed its approach to various other philosophical domains.

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APA

Billingham, P. (2026). What Public Reason Liberals Do and Do Not Need to Say About Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 107(1), 43-56. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.70011

Vancouver

Billingham P. What Public Reason Liberals Do and Do Not Need to Say About Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2026;107(1):43-56. doi:10.1111/papq.70011

BibTeX
@article{Billingham2026,
  author = {Billingham, Paul},
  title = {What Public Reason Liberals Do and Do Not Need to Say About Epistemology},
  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {107},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43--56},
  doi = {10.1111/papq.70011}
}
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