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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways

Kenneth Black

Noûs · 25.10.2026

DOI: 10.1111/nous.70070 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 25.10.2026. Verfasst von Kenneth Black. Die Arbeit nennt 75 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Order‐of‐explanation objections say that some philosophical view implies because , when it's more natural to say that because ; and since such mirroring explanations are presumed to be incompatible, the targeted view must be in conflict with the intuitive explanation. I argue that order‐of‐explanation objections are weaker than they seem, focusing on two cases: functionalism/dispositionalism about mental states and Humeanism about laws of nature. Examining our ordinary practices of explanation, I identify two kinds of explanations, which I call conceptual and contextualizing explanations, which can be jointly compatible even when they mirror one another. This suggests a way of responding to order‐of‐explanation objections: if the targeted philosophical views offer conceptual explanations, and the intuitive explanations they mirror are contextualizing, then the order‐of‐explanation objections have no bite.

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APA

Black, K. (2026). Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70070

Vancouver

Black K. Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways. Noûs. 2026. doi:10.1111/nous.70070

BibTeX
@article{Black2026,
  author = {Black, Kenneth},
  title = {Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways},
  journal = {Noûs},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/nous.70070}
}
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