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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference

Walter Ott

Noûs · 09.07.2026

DOI: 10.1111/nous.70057 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 09.07.2026. Verfasst von Walter Ott. Die Arbeit nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Can animals reason? If so, what would their reasoning consist in, and how, if at all, would it differ from its human counterpart? On these questions, John Locke stakes out a position that also merits consideration today. I argue that, for Locke, reasoning is a matter of the subject's construing her mental states as support for a conclusion, where that conclusion can be a self‐directed imperative. Locke does not require that the subject represent the rules governing her inferences, nor that she use language or deploy abstract ideas. I argue that Locke's particularist, imagistic account is worth taking seriously in the contemporary debates over the nature of inference and animal reasoning.

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APA

Ott, W. (2026). Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70057

Vancouver

Ott W. Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference. Noûs. 2026. doi:10.1111/nous.70057

BibTeX
@article{Ott2026,
  author = {Ott, Walter},
  title = {Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference},
  journal = {Noûs},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/nous.70057}
}
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