Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference
Noûs · 09.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/nous.70057 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 09.07.2026. Verfasst von Walter Ott. Die Arbeit nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Can animals reason? If so, what would their reasoning consist in, and how, if at all, would it differ from its human counterpart? On these questions, John Locke stakes out a position that also merits consideration today. I argue that, for Locke, reasoning is a matter of the subject's construing her mental states as support for a conclusion, where that conclusion can be a self‐directed imperative. Locke does not require that the subject represent the rules governing her inferences, nor that she use language or deploy abstract ideas. I argue that Locke's particularist, imagistic account is worth taking seriously in the contemporary debates over the nature of inference and animal reasoning.
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APA
Ott, W. (2026). Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70057
Vancouver
Ott W. Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference. Noûs. 2026. doi:10.1111/nous.70057
BibTeX
@article{Ott2026,
author = {Ott, Walter},
title = {Animal Logic: Locke and the Nature of Inference},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/nous.70057}
}
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