Life, but Not as We Know It: Why Fine‐Tuning Arguments Fail
Noûs · 14.06.2026
DOI: 10.1111/nous.70052 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 14.06.2026. Verfasst von Joe Gough. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: British Academy.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Definitions of “life” and theories of life are systematically neglected in arguments for and from fine‐tuning. Despite claims to be neutral about the definition of “life,” fine‐tuning arguments generally presuppose that life requires a form of structural complexity only afforded by physicochemical complexity of the sort with which we are familiar, and more specifically, by water and carbon molecules. Conversely, our best accounts of life construe life as a matter of dynamic rather than structural complexity, and as substrate‐ and scale‐independent. Life could be as radically different in the possible universes considered as their physics is. We have no idea whether the relevant form of dynamic complexity would develop in possible universes radically physically unlike our own.
Förderung
- British Academy
Zitieren
APA
Gough, J. (2026). Life, but Not as We Know It: Why Fine‐Tuning Arguments Fail. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70052
Vancouver
Gough J. Life, but Not as We Know It: Why Fine‐Tuning Arguments Fail. Noûs. 2026. doi:10.1111/nous.70052
BibTeX
@article{Gough2026,
author = {Gough, Joe},
title = {Life, but Not as We Know It: Why Fine‐Tuning Arguments Fail},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/nous.70052}
}
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