EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty

Christian Tarsney

Noûs · 2025-12 · 59 (4) · 1093-1125

DOI: 10.1111/nous.12544 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 25.02.2025. Verfasst von Christian Tarsney. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 65 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Expected value maximization gives plausible guidance for moral decision‐making under uncertainty in many situations. But it has unappetizing implications in ‘Pascalian’ situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. This paper shows, first, that under realistic levels of ‘background uncertainty’ about sources of value independent of one's present choice, a widely accepted and apparently innocuous principle—stochastic dominance—requires that prospects be ranked by the expected value of their consequences in most ordinary choice situations. But second, this implication does not hold when differences in expected value are driven by tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. Stochastic dominance therefore lets us draw a surprisingly principled line between ‘ordinary’ and ‘Pascalian’ situations, providing a powerful justification for de facto expected value maximization in the former context while permitting deviations in the latter. Drawing this distinction is incompatible with an in‐principle commitment to maximizing expected value, but does not require too much departure from decision‐theoretic orthodoxy: it is compatible, for instance, with the view that moral agents must maximize the expectation of a utility function that is an increasing function of moral value.

Zitieren

APA

Tarsney, C. (2025). Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty. Noûs, 59(4), 1093-1125. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12544

Vancouver

Tarsney C. Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty. Noûs. 2025;59(4):1093-1125. doi:10.1111/nous.12544

BibTeX
@article{Tarsney2025,
  author = {Tarsney, Christian},
  title = {Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty},
  journal = {Noûs},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {59},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1093--1125},
  doi = {10.1111/nous.12544}
}
Kostenlos starten →