Thing causation
Noûs · 2024-12 · 58 (4) · 1050-1072
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12494 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 20.03.2024. Verfasst von Nathaniel Baron‐Schmitt. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 98 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will.
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APA
Baron‐Schmitt, N. (2024). Thing causation. Noûs, 58(4), 1050-1072. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12494
Vancouver
Baron‐Schmitt N. Thing causation. Noûs. 2024;58(4):1050-1072. doi:10.1111/nous.12494
BibTeX
@article{BaronSchmitt2024,
author = {Baron‐Schmitt, Nathaniel},
title = {Thing causation},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2024},
volume = {58},
number = {4},
pages = {1050--1072},
doi = {10.1111/nous.12494}
}
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