Explaining normative reasons
Noûs · 2023-03 · 57 (1) · 51-80
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12393 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 28.07.2021. Verfasst von Daniel Fogal und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support‐explanationism , for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ ‐ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism— ought‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons‐First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support‐explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non‐naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons‐First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.
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APA
Fogal, D., & Risberg, O. (2023). Explaining normative reasons. Noûs, 57(1), 51-80. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12393
Vancouver
Fogal D, Risberg O. Explaining normative reasons. Noûs. 2023;57(1):51-80. doi:10.1111/nous.12393
BibTeX
@article{Fogal2023,
author = {Fogal, Daniel and Risberg, Olle},
title = {Explaining normative reasons},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2023},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
pages = {51--80},
doi = {10.1111/nous.12393}
}
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