Two candidate cases of multiple personhood
Mind & Language · 29.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/mila.70056 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind & Language, online erschienen am 29.07.2026. Verfasst von Elizabeth Schechter. Die Arbeit nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The split‐brain phenomenon and dissociative identity disorder (DID) have been posed as candidate cases of multiple persons in one body. Philosophers have typically argued that DID subjects are better candidates for multiple personhood because their behavior is more disunified. While a DID subject is intuitively more like multiple persons than is a split‐brain subject, I argue here that the grounds of this intuition do not concern disunified behavior per se. Rather, they concern the differing self‐conceptions of split‐brain subjects on the one hand and at least many DID subjects on the other.
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APA
Schechter, E. (2026). Two candidate cases of multiple personhood. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.70056
Vancouver
Schechter E. Two candidate cases of multiple personhood. Mind & Language. 2026. doi:10.1111/mila.70056
BibTeX
@article{Schechter2026,
author = {Schechter, Elizabeth},
title = {Two candidate cases of multiple personhood},
journal = {Mind & Language},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/mila.70056}
}
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