Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory
Mind & Language · 2026-06 · 41 (3) · 425-431
DOI: 10.1111/mila.70052 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind & Language, online erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von Mikayla Kelley. Die Arbeit nennt 12 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I raise two challenges to Wayne Wu's proposal that intentions are practical memories. The first questions whether practical memories possess the functional roles that Michael Bratman's influential planning theory identifies for intention. The second suggests that a conception of intention as practical memory obscures the logic of intention in our ordinary ethical thought and talk. Both challenges are grounded in methodological reflections on the sources of disagreement in the philosophy of action.
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APA
Kelley, M. (2026). Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory. Mind & Language, 41(3), 425-431. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.70052
Vancouver
Kelley M. Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory. Mind & Language. 2026;41(3):425-431. doi:10.1111/mila.70052
BibTeX
@article{Kelley2026,
author = {Kelley, Mikayla},
title = {Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory},
journal = {Mind & Language},
year = {2026},
volume = {41},
number = {3},
pages = {425--431},
doi = {10.1111/mila.70052}
}
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