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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Quantitative Self‐Defeat Among the Never‐Liars: Kant, Augustine, and Aquinas

Roy Sorensen

Metaphilosophy · 13.11.2026

DOI: 10.1111/meta.70055 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Metaphilosophy, online erschienen am 13.11.2026. Verfasst von Roy Sorensen. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Kant claims that every lie is as grave as perjury. Kant also believed in the opacity of the self. Even if under the impression of telling the truth, the testifier might be lying. Every declaration therefore incurs the risk of being gravely wrong. But instead of being a man of few words, Kant has a career total of two million words. Augustine and Aquinas also forbid all lies. These two prefigurers of Kant rank some lies as far less wrong than other lies. Augustine and Aquinas are also less pessimistic about authors' ability to detect their own lying. Nevertheless, the risk of grave lying remains too high to reconcile with the volubility of Augustine and Aquinas. These giants among the never‐liars exhibit a quantitative weakness that is also present among less prolific and more qualified prohibitors of lying, such as W. D. Ross.

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APA

Sorensen, R. (2026). Quantitative Self‐Defeat Among the Never‐Liars: Kant, Augustine, and Aquinas. Metaphilosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.70055

Vancouver

Sorensen R. Quantitative Self‐Defeat Among the Never‐Liars: Kant, Augustine, and Aquinas. Metaphilosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/meta.70055

BibTeX
@article{Sorensen2026,
  author = {Sorensen, Roy},
  title = {Quantitative Self‐Defeat Among the Never‐Liars: Kant, Augustine, and Aquinas},
  journal = {Metaphilosophy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/meta.70055}
}
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