Epistemic Vice and Motivation
Metaphilosophy · 2018-04 · 49 (3) · 350-367
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12301 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Metaphilosophy, online erschienen am 16.04.2018. Verfasst von Alessandra Tanesini. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 35-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 26 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non‐instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice.
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APA
Tanesini, A. (2018). Epistemic Vice and Motivation. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), 350-367. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12301
Vancouver
Tanesini A. Epistemic Vice and Motivation. Metaphilosophy. 2018;49(3):350-367. doi:10.1111/meta.12301
BibTeX
@article{Tanesini2018,
author = {Tanesini, Alessandra},
title = {Epistemic Vice and Motivation},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2018},
volume = {49},
number = {3},
pages = {350--367},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12301}
}
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