Knowledge with and Without Belief
Metaphilosophy · 2014-01 · 45 (1) · 120-132
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12055 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Metaphilosophy, online erschienen am 13.01.2014. Verfasst von Michael Veber. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some recent epistemological debates. These include debates over the knowledge account of assertion, testimonial knowledge, self‐deception, and the question of whether knowledge can be essentially based on falsehood. It is contended that the sort of distinction offered here provides a way to settle these debates and, at the same time, acknowledge what is correct in the opposing positions.
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APA
Veber, M. (2014). Knowledge with and Without Belief. Metaphilosophy, 45(1), 120-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12055
Vancouver
Veber M. Knowledge with and Without Belief. Metaphilosophy. 2014;45(1):120-132. doi:10.1111/meta.12055
BibTeX
@article{Veber2014,
author = {Veber, Michael},
title = {Knowledge with and Without Belief},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2014},
volume = {45},
number = {1},
pages = {120--132},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12055}
}
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