Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms
The Manchester School · 2015-06 · 83 (3) · 288-306
DOI: 10.1111/manc.12059 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Manchester School, online erschienen am 27.03.2014. Verfasst von Marta San Martín und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 39-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Economy, Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación del Gobierno Vasco, Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the optimal two‐part tariff licensing contract for an internal patentee in a differentiated C ournot duopoly. We find that the type of the royalty payment, whether ad valorem or per‐unit, that it is optimal for the patentee depends on the kind of goods produced in the industry, more precisely on whether they are substitutes or complements and on the degree of product differentiation. We also find that licensing always increases social welfare, although it may hurt consumers.
Förderung
- Spanish Ministry of Economy
- Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación del Gobierno Vasco
- Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco
Zitieren
APA
Martín, M. S., & Saracho, A. I. (2015). Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms. The Manchester School, 83(3), 288-306. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12059
Vancouver
Martín MS, Saracho AI. Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms. The Manchester School. 2015;83(3):288-306. doi:10.1111/manc.12059
BibTeX
@article{Martn2015,
author = {Martín, Marta San and Saracho, Ana I.},
title = {Optimal Two‐part Tariff Licensing Mechanisms},
journal = {The Manchester School},
year = {2015},
volume = {83},
number = {3},
pages = {288--306},
doi = {10.1111/manc.12059}
}
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