Environmental Regulation: A Novel “Booster” of Competition Policy?
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2026-12 · 28 (6)
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70156 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 15.11.2026. Verfasst von Ana Espinola‐Arredondo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate how emission fees affect the effectiveness of competition policy (audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs) at deterring collusion. When competition policy is absent, emission fees hinder collusion if profit losses from deviation are more affected by the fee than profit gains. When competition policy is present, we show that fees amplify the effectiveness of audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs at deterring collusive practices. Our results suggest that leniency and whistleblower programs can reduce rewards in polluting industries without diminishing their impact. Our findings are robust to production costs being convex, differentiated products, industries with more than two firms, and firms competing in prices.
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APA
Espinola‐Arredondo, A., & Munoz‐Garcia, F. (2026). Environmental Regulation: A Novel “Booster” of Competition Policy?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(6). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70156
Vancouver
Espinola‐Arredondo A, Munoz‐Garcia F. Environmental Regulation: A Novel “Booster” of Competition Policy?. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2026;28(6). doi:10.1111/jpet.70156
BibTeX
@article{EspinolaArredondo2026,
author = {Espinola‐Arredondo, Ana and Munoz‐Garcia, Felix},
title = {Environmental Regulation: A Novel “Booster” of Competition Policy?},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {28},
number = {6},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.70156}
}
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