Teaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2026-12 · 28 (6)
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70152 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 09.11.2026. Verfasst von Pim Heijnen und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider a rent‐seeking contest where two players compete for a single prize. Each player can exert effort in two complementary activities to influence his probability of winning. Each player also has the option to hire a delegate to exert effort in one of these activities on his behalf. We show that if the probability of winning the contest is sensitive enough to the efforts, in equilibrium one of the players teams up with a delegate, whereas the other player does not do so. Hence, delegation by one player arises endogenously in this case.
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APA
Heijnen, P., & Schoonbeek, L. (2026). Teaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(6). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70152
Vancouver
Heijnen P, Schoonbeek L. Teaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2026;28(6). doi:10.1111/jpet.70152
BibTeX
@article{Heijnen2026,
author = {Heijnen, Pim and Schoonbeek, Lambert},
title = {Teaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {28},
number = {6},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.70152}
}
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