Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 28 (3)
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70121 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von Licun Xue. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We propose and study the following mechanism: Agents simultaneously make contributions. If the total contribution is below the cost, contributions are refunded; otherwise the public good is provided and budget surplus, if there is any, is shared equally among the agents. Our mechanism mitigates the incentive to under‐contribute in the well‐studied “subscription mechanism” where budget surplus is retained by the mechanism designer. We identify conditions under which our mechanism achieves the maximal total expected gain among all Bayesian mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget‐balanced.
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APA
Xue, L. (2026). Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70121
Vancouver
Xue L. Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2026;28(3). doi:10.1111/jpet.70121
BibTeX
@article{Xue2026,
author = {Xue, Licun},
title = {Split the Budget Surplus: Towards a Second Best Mechanism for a Discrete Public Good Under Private Information},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {28},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.70121}
}
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