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Tax Buyouts in Oligopoly

Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 28 (3)

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70116 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 28.05.2026. Verfasst von Giorgos Stamatopoulos. Die Arbeit nennt 37 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We analyze a novel tax mechanism in imperfectly competitive product markets. The government announces a per unit (or excise) tax rate and auctions‐off a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms in the market to acquire the right to be exempted from the per unit tax. The highest bidders are exempted by paying their bids; and all other firms remain subject to it. The mechanism has a number of desirable features. First, it allows the government to collect more revenues than the standard tax policies. Further it reduces distortions as fewer firms pay the per unit tax. The mechanism reduces also the excess entry of firms that often occurs in oligopolistic markets. It creates no discrimination as all firms end up having the same net payoff, and it is voluntary as the firms choose whether to participate in the auction or not (and hence choose how to be taxed). Our mechanism can be seen as the product‐market analog of the income tax buyout fiscal mechanism (Del Negro et al. 2010).

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APA

Stamatopoulos, G. (2026). Tax Buyouts in Oligopoly. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70116

Vancouver

Stamatopoulos G. Tax Buyouts in Oligopoly. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2026;28(3). doi:10.1111/jpet.70116

BibTeX
@article{Stamatopoulos2026,
  author = {Stamatopoulos, Giorgos},
  title = {Tax Buyouts in Oligopoly},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.70116}
}
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