Market Microstructure and Informational Complexity
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 28 (3)
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70114 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 07.05.2026. Verfasst von Rafael R. Guthmann und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 58 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Competitive markets feature minimal informational complexity; agents only need to know prices to implement an efficient allocation. However, the standard formulation of competitive equilibrium neglects the mechanism of price formation, treating prices as exogenous. Here, we study explicit price formation mechanisms: trade intermediated by market‐makers and trade via search and bargaining. We find that as the number of types in the economy grows, the informational complexity of random search diverges to infinity relative to the competitive market. This divergence can be avoided if market makers intermediate trade. Thus, this analysis provides a novel rationale for organized markets if agents' capacity to manage informational complexity is bounded.
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APA
Guthmann, R. R., & Albrecht, B. C. (2026). Market Microstructure and Informational Complexity. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70114
Vancouver
Guthmann RR, Albrecht BC. Market Microstructure and Informational Complexity. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2026;28(3). doi:10.1111/jpet.70114
BibTeX
@article{Guthmann2026,
author = {Guthmann, Rafael R. and Albrecht, Brian C.},
title = {Market Microstructure and Informational Complexity},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {28},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.70114}
}
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