Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2025-06 · 27 (3)
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70042 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 17.06.2025. Verfasst von Yunjie Shi und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze voluntary public good contributions with incomplete information. A fundraiser chooses whether to disclose or withhold contributions as they occur, and two contributors choose the size and (eventually) the order of their contributions. Contributions made without announcement—thus simultaneous—minimize free‐riding incentives of contributors with low valuations, whereas contributions with disclosure of past donations—thus sequential—minimize those of contributors with high valuations. To maximize aggregate contributions, a fundraiser permits sequential contributions when high valuations are prevalent or significantly exceed low valuations. Otherwise, simultaneous contributions are preferred.
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APA
Shi, Y., Fabrizi, S., & Lippert, S. (2025). Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 27(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70042
Vancouver
Shi Y, Fabrizi S, Lippert S. Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2025;27(3). doi:10.1111/jpet.70042
BibTeX
@article{Shi2025,
author = {Shi, Yunjie and Fabrizi, Simona and Lippert, Steffen},
title = {Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2025},
volume = {27},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.70042}
}
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