EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Political contestability and public contracting

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller

Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2019-10 · 21 (5) · 945-966

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12325 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018-08. Verfasst von Marian W. Moszoro und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from opportunistic third parties—political opponents, competitors, and interest groups. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenges, while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. We study this matter and provide a comprehensive theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

Zitieren

APA

Moszoro, M. W., & Spiller, P. T. (2019). Political contestability and public contracting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21(5), 945-966. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12325

Vancouver

Moszoro MW, Spiller PT. Political contestability and public contracting. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2019;21(5):945-966. doi:10.1111/jpet.12325

BibTeX
@article{Moszoro2019,
  author = {Moszoro, Marian W. and Spiller, Pablo T.},
  title = {Political contestability and public contracting},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {21},
  number = {5},
  pages = {945--966},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.12325}
}
Kostenlos starten →