Political contestability and public contracting
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2019-10 · 21 (5) · 945-966
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12325 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018-08. Verfasst von Marian W. Moszoro und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from opportunistic third parties—political opponents, competitors, and interest groups. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenges, while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. We study this matter and provide a comprehensive theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.
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APA
Moszoro, M. W., & Spiller, P. T. (2019). Political contestability and public contracting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 21(5), 945-966. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12325
Vancouver
Moszoro MW, Spiller PT. Political contestability and public contracting. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2019;21(5):945-966. doi:10.1111/jpet.12325
BibTeX
@article{Moszoro2019,
author = {Moszoro, Marian W. and Spiller, Pablo T.},
title = {Political contestability and public contracting},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2019},
volume = {21},
number = {5},
pages = {945--966},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.12325}
}
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