Voter Turnout and Political Rents
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2015-08 · 17 (4) · 528-552
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12141 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 15.07.2015. Verfasst von GANI ALDASHEV. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Is the decline in voter turnout an indicator of a worse health of a representative democracy? We build a simple probabilistic‐voting model with endogenous turnout to address this question. We find that a lower turnout caused by a higher cost of voting implies higher political rents. Contrarily, a lower turnout caused by a higher ideological mobility of voters or by a lower expressive benefit of voting implies lower political rents. If voters have a civic‐duty motive to vote that depends on the level of rents, multiple equilibria (a high‐rents low‐turnout and a low‐rents high‐turnout) arise.
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APA
ALDASHEV, G. (2015). Voter Turnout and Political Rents. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 17(4), 528-552. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12141
Vancouver
ALDASHEV G. Voter Turnout and Political Rents. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2015;17(4):528-552. doi:10.1111/jpet.12141
BibTeX
@article{ALDASHEV2015,
author = {ALDASHEV, GANI},
title = {Voter Turnout and Political Rents},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2015},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
pages = {528--552},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.12141}
}
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