Moral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act
Journal of Risk and Insurance · 21.08.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jori.70075 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Risk and Insurance, online erschienen am 21.08.2026. Verfasst von Cameron M. Ellis und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We identify and quantify a new form of welfare loss in insurance markets. We first show theoretically that moral hazard from subsidies for cost‐sharing combined with community rating mimics adverse selection and can unravel insurance markets. To quantify the potential welfare loss, we use exogenous variation in the number of subsidized enrollees on the ACA exchanges. We find that subsidy‐induced moral hazard led to higher premiums, which has lowered enrollment among the unsubsidized by 6.2 percentage points. We estimate the welfare costs of this “moral hazard induced unraveling” to be around 25% of the total welfare loss.
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APA
Ellis, C. M., Esson, M. I., & Liebman, E. (2026). Moral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act. Journal of Risk and Insurance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70075
Vancouver
Ellis CM, Esson MI, Liebman E. Moral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2026. doi:10.1111/jori.70075
BibTeX
@article{Ellis2026,
author = {Ellis, Cameron M. and Esson, Meghan I. and Liebman, Eli},
title = {Moral hazard induced unraveling: Theory and evidence from the Affordable Care Act},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jori.70075}
}
EUVIMED