Aggregate risks and insurance with heterogeneous agents
Journal of Risk and Insurance · 29.04.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jori.70054 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Risk and Insurance, online erschienen am 29.04.2026. Verfasst von Takuma Kunieda und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Kwansei Gakuin University, Kyoto University, Osaka University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper explores whether insurance against aggregate risk is effective in economies with heterogeneous agents. While aggregate shocks are typically viewed as uninsurable, we show that insurance becomes effective when agents differ in productivity or initial wealth. We develop a two‐period general equilibrium model with a CES production technology and Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman preferences. Insurance is effective only when heterogeneity generates asymmetric income responses, in which case state‐contingent claims restore Pareto efficiency. Quantitative results show that welfare gains arise only with heterogeneity and are larger for agents further from the average. Moreover, welfare gains increase with dispersion, while the effect of average exposure is non‐monotonic due to general‐equilibrium price adjustments.
Förderung
- Kwansei Gakuin University
- Kyoto University
- Osaka University
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
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APA
Kunieda, T., & Shibata, A. (2026). Aggregate risks and insurance with heterogeneous agents. Journal of Risk and Insurance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70054
Vancouver
Kunieda T, Shibata A. Aggregate risks and insurance with heterogeneous agents. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2026. doi:10.1111/jori.70054
BibTeX
@article{Kunieda2026,
author = {Kunieda, Takuma and Shibata, Akihisa},
title = {Aggregate risks and insurance with heterogeneous agents},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jori.70054}
}
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