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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Mitigating moral hazard with usage‐based insurance

Julia Holzapfel, Richard Peter, Andreas Richter

Journal of Risk and Insurance · 2024-12 · 91 (4) · 813-839

DOI: 10.1111/jori.12433 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Risk and Insurance, online erschienen am 12.06.2023. Verfasst von Julia Holzapfel und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Technological progress has improved insurers' ability to monitor policyholders and has led to usage‐based insurance (UBI) contracts that incorporate behavioral risk factors in pricing. Economic theory predicts that any informative monitoring signal is adopted in equilibrium. In practice, the demand for UBI is still low to date with market shares in the single digits. We modify the standard moral‐hazard model in insurance economics by trading off a simpler effort model for a richer strategy space, and by focusing on the use of monitoring for premium differentiation. In our model, an informative monitoring technology is in use if it is sufficiently accurate. Otherwise, the premium incentive from monitoring is not large enough to alleviate the incentive‐compatibility constraint to an extent that would make policyholders better off. Our results help explain the slow adoption of UBI contracts in practice and provide an avenue to increase their appeal to policyholders.

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APA

Holzapfel, J., Peter, R., & Richter, A. (2024). Mitigating moral hazard with usage‐based insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 91(4), 813-839. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12433

Vancouver

Holzapfel J, Peter R, Richter A. Mitigating moral hazard with usage‐based insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2024;91(4):813-839. doi:10.1111/jori.12433

BibTeX
@article{Holzapfel2024,
  author = {Holzapfel, Julia and Peter, Richard and Richter, Andreas},
  title = {Mitigating moral hazard with usage‐based insurance},
  journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {91},
  number = {4},
  pages = {813--839},
  doi = {10.1111/jori.12433}
}
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