Competitive Actions under Analyst Pressure: The Role of CEO Time Horizons
Journal of Management Studies · 2024-07 · 61 (5) · 1916-1945
DOI: 10.1111/joms.12964 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Management Studies, online erschienen am 06.06.2023. Verfasst von Jianhong Chen und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 23-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 112 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Leveraging upper echelons theory and the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability (AMC) framework of competitive dynamics, we investigate the moderating influence of CEO time horizons on the relationship between negative analyst recommendations and the temporal patterning of competitive actions. We argue that negative recommendations are associated with less intensity but greater irregularity in competitive actions. Moreover, CEO time horizons weaken these effects, such that CEOs with longer time horizons are less influenced by such recommendations. Results from a longitudinal study of 296 CEOs from 2004 to 2015 support these arguments. Our study contributes by underscoring CEO time horizon as a critical contingency in studying the impact of analyst pressures.
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APA
Chen, J., Lien, W., Miller, D., & Chen, T. (2024). Competitive Actions under Analyst Pressure: The Role of CEO Time Horizons. Journal of Management Studies, 61(5), 1916-1945. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12964
Vancouver
Chen J, Lien W, Miller D, Chen T. Competitive Actions under Analyst Pressure: The Role of CEO Time Horizons. Journal of Management Studies. 2024;61(5):1916-1945. doi:10.1111/joms.12964
BibTeX
@article{Chen2024,
author = {Chen, Jianhong and Lien, Wan‐Chien and Miller, Danny and Chen, Tianxu},
title = {Competitive Actions under Analyst Pressure: The Role of CEO Time Horizons},
journal = {Journal of Management Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {61},
number = {5},
pages = {1916--1945},
doi = {10.1111/joms.12964}
}
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