Asymmetric Pass‐Through and Competition
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 22.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/joie.70036 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 22.07.2026. Verfasst von Christos Genakos und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the retail price pass‐through of four major tax changes in petroleum products using daily pricing data from gas stations on small Greek islands. We find that (i) the pass‐through of the tax hikes is five times higher than for the tax decrease, (ii) the pass‐through of the tax hikes increases with competition, while that of the tax decrease does not, (iii) there is significant asymmetry in the speed of price adjustments, and (iv) the asymmetric price adjustment can be rationalized by either tacit collusion or consumer search behavior, as the most plausible explanations.
Förderung
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
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APA
Genakos, C., Lyu, Y., & Pagliero, M. (2026). Asymmetric Pass‐Through and Competition. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70036
Vancouver
Genakos C, Lyu Y, Pagliero M. Asymmetric Pass‐Through and Competition. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/joie.70036
BibTeX
@article{Genakos2026,
author = {Genakos, Christos and Lyu, Yuan and Pagliero, Mario},
title = {Asymmetric Pass‐Through and Competition},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/joie.70036}
}
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