Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 12.06.2026
DOI: 10.1111/joie.70031 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 12.06.2026. Verfasst von Jay Pil Choi. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims. We show that the possibility of future patent claims makes it optimal to include a per‐unit royalty. The royalty reduces the surplus available to potential third‐party claimants and serves as a rent‐protection device, trading off allocative inefficiency against hold‐up risk. Restrictions on the contracting space can be justified when more realistic features of demand uncertainty or stochastic patent arrival are considered.
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APA
Choi, J. P. (2026). Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70031
Vancouver
Choi JP. Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/joie.70031
BibTeX
@article{Choi2026,
author = {Choi, Jay Pil},
title = {Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/joie.70031}
}
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