Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2026-06 · 74 (2) · 278-294
DOI: 10.1111/joie.70023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 23.02.2026. Verfasst von Robin Mamrak. Die Arbeit nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Elite Network of Bavaria.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
How does antitrust enforcement affect innovation when patents are the main barrier to entry? I address this question by empirically studying the US antitrust case against Xerox, the former monopolist in the market for plain‐paper copiers. In 1975, Xerox accepted a consent decree whose primary remedy was compulsory licensing of all its copier‐technology patents in the US and abroad. I show that this antitrust intervention promoted innovation by other firms in the copier industry, measured by a disproportionate increase in patenting in technology classes with a higher propensity for containing copier‐related inventions. This effect is driven by Japanese competitors, whose patenting became more novel and diverse as they started developing smaller desktop copiers.
Förderung
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Elite Network of Bavaria
Zitieren
APA
Mamrak, R. (2026). Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 74(2), 278-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70023
Vancouver
Mamrak R. Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026;74(2):278-294. doi:10.1111/joie.70023
BibTeX
@article{Mamrak2026,
author = {Mamrak, Robin},
title = {Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {278--294},
doi = {10.1111/joie.70023}
}
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