Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2026-06 · 74 (2) · 181-196
DOI: 10.1111/joie.70017 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 13.01.2026. Verfasst von Joseph E. Harrington. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A data analytics company delivers an efficiency by supplying a pricing algorithm that allows prices to more effectively respond to demand variation. In this setting, I consider a new form of hub‐and‐spoke collusion: A data analytics company (hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through its pricing algorithm. A novel finding is that the data analytics company's efficiency is a facilitating factor for collusion; a rise in this efficiency increases the supracompetitive markup and the incremental profit from collusion. Thus, markets in which a third party's services are solidly grounded in efficiency still warrant scrutiny by competition authorities because they are more prone to the emergence of collusion and anticompetitive harm.
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APA
Harrington, J. E. (2026). Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 74(2), 181-196. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70017
Vancouver
Harrington JE. Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026;74(2):181-196. doi:10.1111/joie.70017
BibTeX
@article{Harrington2026,
author = {Harrington, Joseph E.},
title = {Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {181--196},
doi = {10.1111/joie.70017}
}
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