Merger and Entry With Learning
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2025-06 · 73 (2) · 235-253
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12407 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 06.01.2025. Verfasst von Yves Guéron und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Research Foundation of Korea, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study dynamic market competition between a monopoly incumbent and an entrant experimenting with disruptive innovation. The incumbent can pursue the uncertain innovation after acquiring the disruptor, who may be more productive and privately know its ability. Mergers generate synergies. We characterize perfect equilibria in Markov strategies on bargaining and R&D. The equilibrium path is determined by the interaction between market belief in the unobservable state and the distribution of private information. Asymmetric information generates failed mergers and buyout effects. Inefficient mergers arise from imperfect returns to R&D. There may be under‐ or over‐investment. We provide implications for antitrust policy.
Förderung
- National Research Foundation of Korea
- Institute of Economic Research
- Seoul National University
Zitieren
APA
Guéron, Y., & Lee, J. (2025). Merger and Entry With Learning. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 73(2), 235-253. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12407
Vancouver
Guéron Y, Lee J. Merger and Entry With Learning. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2025;73(2):235-253. doi:10.1111/joie.12407
BibTeX
@article{Guron2025,
author = {Guéron, Yves and Lee, Jihong},
title = {Merger and Entry With Learning},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2025},
volume = {73},
number = {2},
pages = {235--253},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12407}
}
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